
.WX7 



SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES. 



SPEECH 



OF 



HON. HIRAM WARNER, OF GEORGIA. 

DELIVERED 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, APRIL 1, 1856, 

On the Power of the General Government to exclude Slave Property from Ike Territories- 

'A/ 

, 



The House being in the Committee of the 
Whole, and having under consideration the Pres- 
ident's Annual Message, 

Mr. WARNER, said: 

Mr. Chairman: The gentleman from Indiana, 
[Mr. Brenton,] who last addressed the commit- 
tee upon the subject of the President's message, 
thought proper to arraign that officer before the 
country, for calling the attention of the people of 
the non-slaveholding States to their constitutional 
obligations, in regard to the institution of slavery 
as it exists in the United States. Before final 
j udgment shall be rendered upon that arraignment, 
it may be proper to inquire, whether there existed 
any necessity, any occasion, for the discharge of 
that high and responsible duty, on the part of the 
Chief Magistrate of the Union ? Has dure been 
formed, in any portion of this Confederacy, a sec- 
tional political organization, for the purpose of 
depriving the people of the slaveholding States 
of rights solemnly guarantied to them by the 
Constitution? 

Passing by, for the present, the repeated at- 
tempts that have been made in some of the free 
States to nullify the fugitive slave law, what, sir, 
have we witnessed in this Hall in regard to such 
a sectional political organization? When we first 
assembled here for the purpose of effecting an 
organization of this House, the senior member 
from Ohio [Mr. Gipdivgs] declared the line of 
policy that should govern him and his political 
friends in that organization; that line of policy 
was declared to be, to invoke the power of this 
Government for the purpose of excluding slave 
property from the common territory of the Union. 
The distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts 
was put in nomination for the Speaker's chair, to 
carry into practical effect that declared line of 
policy; and during the nine weeks' struggle which 
ensued here, that distinguished gentleman — for 
the purpose of uniting the support of his political 
friends — declared, in his place, that he was in 
favor of protecting the property of southern men 
as well as northern men in the common territory 
of the Union: that is to say, all such property 



as is recognized as property by the universal law 
of nations, but that property in slaves was not 
so recognized by that universal law; therefore, 
was not entitled to be protected in that common 
territory; that slavery existed in the States by 
force of positive law; and that whenever the 
owner of that property took it beyond the terri- 
torial limits of such State, it ceased to be entitled 
to protection as property. With these declared 
opinions, the result of that protracted contest is 
well known to this House and to the country. 

Those who invoke the power of this Govern- 
ment to exclude slavery from the common ter- 
ritory, give as a reason therefor, that they are in 
favor of liberty; that they are in favor of the 
extension of liberty. I, too, sir, am in favor of 
liberty, and am in favor of the extension of lib- 
erty; but it is not that wild, unbridled, licentious, 
higher-law liberty, that whetted the guillotine and 
deluged the streets of revolutionary France with 
blood; but it is that liberty which brings healing 
on its wings; it is American liberty; it is constitu- 
tional liberty; which protects the citizen in the 
enjoyment of all his civil and religious rights, and 
his rights of property; that liberty, sir, which the 
fathers of the Republic intended to secure and 
perpetuate, not only for themselves but their 
posterity, when they scaled the bond of union 
between the States of this Confederacy. It is the 
fundamental principles of that American liberty, 
of that constitutional liberty, which 1 propose to 
discuss to-day; and I shall endeavor to maintain 
and to demonstrate that, in accordance with those 
fundamental principles, my constituents have 
both the legal and equitable right to take their 
slave property into the common territory of this 
Union, to have it protected there; and that this 
Government has no power under the Constitution 
to deprive them of that right. 

It will be recollected that the Federal Constitu- 
tion was not established to create neto rights, but 
to secure and protect existing rights. Hence it is 
material to inquire, what were the rights of the 
people of the slaveholding States in regard to their 
slave property, before and at the tune of the 






adoption of that Constitution? I shall maintain, 
and undertake to establish, that the title of my 
constituents to their slave property is not based 
upon any positive law of the State, but that it rests 
for its foundation upon the universal law of na- 
tions, which recognized slaves as property, before 
and at the time of the adoption of the Constitu- 
tion. That before and at the time of the adoption : 
of the Constitution, the citizens of the State of | 
Georgia— the same being a sovereign, independ- 
ent State— had the undoubted right, according to 
the well-established principles of international 
law, to take their slave property into any foreign 
territory; provided there was no law in that for- 
eign territory profiting its introduction lie re, 
and to have it protected in such foreign territory; 
that the law of nations was adopted as a part of 
the common law in the original thirteen States, 
constituting a part of the law of the land before 
and at the" time of the adoption of the Federal 
Constitution. 

It has been asserted here and elsewhere that 
slavery exists in the States by force of positive la w; 
and that whenever the owner takes his slave prop- 
erty beyond the territorial limits of such State, 
his title to that property ceases to be valid and 
operative for the protection of that property. I 
controvert this assumed proposition. There is no 
statute in the State of Georgia, either colonial or 
since the adoption of her State constitution, which 
d :1 ii s that slaves shall be property within the 
territorial limits of that State; and, so far as I 
know or believe, there is not such a statute in a 
single slave h biding State in this Union, consti- 
tuting the original bards and foundation of title to 
slave property. We have many statutes which 
regulate the institution of slavery — statutes which 
confer privileges upon the slave— statutes which 
regulate the conduct of the master towards his 
slave, and which recognize slaves as property— but 
no statute declaring that slaves shall he property 
within the territorial limits of the State. And 
when we come to look into the history of this 
thing, it would be remarkable, indeed, if any such 
statute had ever existed. Have you any statutes 
in the non-slaveholding States which declare that 
your ships, your merchandise, your looms, and 
your spindles shall be property within the terri- 
torial limits of your respective States? I appre- 
hend not; no more have we any statutes in the 
slaveholding States, declaring that slaves shall 
be property within the territorial limits thereof. 
The truth is, that title to slave property in the 
slaveholding State.s rests upon t he. same foundation 
as title to any other species of property, to wit: 
the universal law of nations. Those who assert 
that slavery exists in the States by force of pos- 
itive law caii, if that assi rtion be true, very easily 
settle the question by the production of the de- 
clared will of the' supreme power of such States; 
embodied in the form of a legislative enactment; 
produce the evidence of that positive law in a 
1 gitimate'and authentic form, to sustain the truth 
of the assertion. Those who assert the affirma- 
tive of that proposition, are bound to furnish the 
evidence of that positive law enacted by the 
States; or yield the point. They content them- 
selves with relying on the loose declarations of 
judges in the slaveholding States; the mere obiter 
dictum of judges, (in cases in which the question 
we are discussing was not presented by the record 



for their consideration and judgment,) as the 
evidence of positive law enacted by the supreme 
power "m the States declaring that slaves shall 
be property within the territorial limits of the 
respective States. 

The question very naturally presents itself, if 
those who assert that slavery exists in the States 
by force of positive law, and that when the owner 
of slave property takes it beyond the territorial 
limits of his State, his title to that property ceases 
and determines, why is it that they desire to in- 
voke the power of the Federal Government to 
exclude slave property from the Territories? 
Such an act would be entirely unnecessary, if the 
title of the owner ceases and determines when 
he passes with his slave property beyond the 
limits of the States, where it is asserted his title 
exists by force of positive law. The fact that 
you desire to invoke' the power of this Govern- 
ment to enact a law to exclude slave property 
from the common territory, furnishes strong evi- 
dence that you have not entire confidence in the 
position assumed and asserted, that slavery ex- 
ists in the States by force of positive law, and 
that the owner loses his title to his slave property 
by taking it beyond the limits of such States. 

I beg leave to call the attention of the House 
to the "history of the title of my constituents to 
their slave property. What I shall say in regard 
to that title in Georgia will be equally applicable 
to the other slaveholding States, so far as the 
foundation of that title is concerned. The colony 
of Georgia was originally settled as a free colony; 
that is to say, African slavery was prohibited from 
being introduced there by the charter granted to 
the trustees. It remained a free colony about fif- 
teen years after its first settlement; the soil and 
climate were adapted to slave labor: the colonists 
desired to have it, but the home Government re- 
fused to repeal the prohibition. The-resuit was, 
that the colony was about to come to nothing. 
The prohibition was taken off, and African slavi s 
were allowed to be brought into the colony. Some 
few were brought in from the other slaveholding 
colonies, but the most of them were brought in 
ley those who were engaged in the African slave 
trade; and who they were, the past history of the 
country furnishes' abundant evidence. African 
slaves were brought into this colony as property; 
they were made property before they were brought 
there; they were sold to our people as properly, 
purchased by them as property, paid for by them 
as property, held by them as propi rty, precisely 
upon the same footing as the} held every other 
species of property. 

Were those from whom my constituents ori- 
ginally purchased their slave property engaged in 
a lawful trade— in a trade recogmzi d as lawful by 
the universal law of nations ? This question came 
before the courts of Great Britain in the year 
1817. A French vessel called Le Louis was 
engaged i i the African slaw trade, and was cap- 
tured by a British cruiser. France at that time 
not having entered into treaty stipulations' abol- 
ishing that trade, the vessel was taken into a 
)h port, and condemned by the vice admi- 
ralty court as lawful prize for being engaged in 
a trade forbidden by the universal law of nations, 
and therefor.: criminal by that law. From the 
judgment of the vice admiralty court an appeal 
was' taken to the higher court of admiralty of 






<^ 



Great Britain. The appellate court reversed the 
it of the vice admiralty court, and held 
that the African slave trade was hoi unlawful by 
t!ie universal law "t" nations, and was not crim- 
inal by that law, which rec ignized property in 
African slaves. The judgment of the high court 
of admiralty was delivered by Lord Stowell, 
better known as Sir William Scott; and I beg 
leave to read to the House a portion of that judg- 
faaent. Speaking of the African slave trade, the 
learned judge said: 

"Let me not li • misunderstood or misrepresented a< a 
professed ap >K< ^ist for this practice, when I state facts which 
ho man can deny— that personal slavery arising out 
ble cap ivity is coi val with the earliest periods of the history 
of mankind— that it is found existing (and, as appears, with- 
out animadversion) in the earliest and m i-t authentic rec- 
ords of the human race— that it is recognized by the cod is 
of th • mo-t |i dish • I nations of antiquity— that, under the 
light of Christianity iu ission of persons so ac- 

quired has bei u in every civilized country invested with the 
such l>;i all the pi I x 
lions of 1 1 thai ol mn treaties have been framed, and 
national monopolies eagerly sought to facilitate and ext wd 
the commerce in this asserted property — and all this, with 
all tin' sanctions of I iw, public and muuicip il, and u ithoul 

: the protests o a few pri i ate moral- 
ists, littl ' hi ii.! . id less atl mded to in every country, till 
Within iln-so veryfew years in this particular country. What 
is the doi trine of our courts or the law of nations relatively 
to those natio us which adhere to the practice of carrying 

rican slave trade ? Whythat their pract is to 

:. ■ resp •,■■ ; ■ laves, if taken', are to be restore I 

to tli. -in : and, if not tak 'n under innocent im>i i!%'\ to be 
restored with r,i*t> ami J images. \ I this surelj , upon the 
ground that such conduct on the part of auj State is no 

svs of nations. The notorious fact Is, 
that in the d'Mii ■ co'untiy, and others^ many 

thousands of persona are held as legal ■property, they and 
their posterity, up in no other original title than that which 
I am now called upon to pronounce a crime — every que of 
th:-sf instarn es atl md id with ail the aggravations that ap- 
pertain to the long continuation of crime, if cram- it be ; 
and yel protected by lav with nil the. securities thiol can be 
given to properly in Us 7i adfjTrns. ,, -r-5ld Dodson's 

Admiralty Report, pp. 2j l-"I-' - J. 

In Madrazo vs. Willis, (5th Eng. Com. Law 
Reports, page 315,) the same doctrine is fully 
recognized by the Court of King's Bench. Bayly, 
J., in delivering his judgment in that case, said, 
speaking of the African slave trade — 

•• It i- true that, if this were a trade contrary to the law hf 

nations, tti . I not maintain this, action, Butil 

iSptni mot ii-- conside • d a ■ b mnd bj 

if i!i" British Legislature prohibiting this trade, it 

ive him of a r imedy for the wrong 

which he has sustained. He bad a leg : pi >perty in the 

slaves of which he has, in the defendant's act, been de- 

d." . 

. J., after citing several authorities, says: 
'• .- ; ; . ira these authi rities, that the sla 

il law of nati m -." 

In the case of the Antelope, reported in 10th 

Wheatoi . 121, Chief Justice Marshall, 

of the slave trade, says: 

Europ 'ami Am 1 1 ■ i embarked in it. and fornearly 

"i ,■■- it was carried on without opposition and with- 

i jurist ran!. I not say thai a pi icti :e i ius 

supp irtcd was illegal, an il mighl h • 

Bul I have still higher authority in f 

id thai 
, the Fed I 

as lawful 
Constitution , 

, Lnce for tw ■ ivi les that 

imported i 
should be ta ng ten dollars per 

head. 



Mr. GIDDINGS. Will the gentleman permit 
I me to propound a question to him ? 

Mr. WARNER. Oh yes, certainly. 

Mr GIDDINGS. I would inquire whether 
the gentleman holds that those American Chris- 
who were captured and held to slavery, 
j and who were transferred from own r to owner. 
I.i V the Alger ines, in the latter pari of the' last ami 
; the first part of the present century, were prop- 
j crty ? 

Mr. WARNER. I am not discussing the. 
question of Algcrine slavery — I am discu 
the question of African slavery, a dby 

the Constitul i 

Mr. GIDDINGS. Dors the gentleman ac- 
knowledge that those Americans captured and 
held by the Algerines were property? 

Mr. WARNER. I do not make any such 
admission, nor is it necessary thi I 1 should doso, 
for the purposes of my argument. 

Mr. GIDDINGS. That is what I want an 
ah Iwer to. 

Mr. WARNER. I have nol referred to the 
Americans Who were captured by the Algerines. 
I am discussing the question of African slavery 
as it exists in I he United States. 

Mr. GIDDINGS. Africans can be held by 
Americans, as slave property. 

Mr. WARNER. They were recognized as 
property by the universal law of nations beforej 
and at the time of the adoption of, the Constitu- 
tion, and are now held as property under the 
sanction and guarantee of that instrument. 

Mr. GIDDINGS. Are Americans property 
when held by Africans as slaves? 

Mr. WARNER. I do not recollect at this 
time such a state of things as the gentleman from 
Ohio supposes. 

Mr. GIDDINGS. 1 commend the gentleman 
to the history of the country. 

Mr. WARNER. I will not allow the gentle- 
man to make a caw for me to dis uss. I am dis- 
cussing questions which arise under the laws and 
Constitution of t/i£scountry; and in return for his 
admonitory counsel would heartily commend him 
to the Constitution of his country, and the obli^i- 
tions which it impo les. 

Mr. Chairman, when interrupt 
man from Ohio, I w 

s rate thai property in slaves was i I by 

miversal law of nations b .nice 

doption of the Constitution, and that my 

. tituerits originally purch ised thei 
erty from I 

tradr, and n COgl I > I lawful 
sal law of nations, an le to their 

I up mi til it universal law 
of nations, i I bei and at the time 

I titution,and not upon 
any positiv i law of the S 

i am not ignorant, sir, that long since the adop- 
tion of the Constitution, and long title 
of my con . ic- 
■ . the United Si ites, th in le- 
pend of the world, h ive entered into 

A frican slave 

ulatio s w :re not in- 

i not h.r. livest 

rights to slave property which b I and 

i, i ij which were recognized 

by the Constitution as lawful and valid. After 



4 



the Revolution, as we all know, the colonies be- I free by the authorities of that place, combated 
came independent States. The State of Georgia j| the idea that a man's title to his slave property- 
had as perfect and complete jurisdiction over all | has no extra territorial operation, in the following 
persons and property within her territorial limits, | strong and emphatic language. After referring 
as any sovereign State or nation on the face of ' to local laic in respect to marriages, he continues: 
the earth; she owed allegiance to no other Power! "Did any one ever imagine that local law acted upon 
or Government. The commission issued by that such marriages to anniiiUate their obligations, if the party 

S. . . i 11 . . c < t i rri j . .. i" r'.,., should visit a countrv in wh:ch muni il'"s must be eele- 
tate to her delegates to frame the federal Lou- - 



stitution states her true character at that time. 
That commission is headed with these memorable 
words: "The State of Georgia, by the grace of 
God,/ree, sovereign, and independent." 

Now, sir, let us inquire what rights the people 
of that independent State had, in relation to taking 
their slave property into any foreign territory, 
and to have that property protected there by the 
universal law of nations before and at the time 
of the adoption of the Constitution? 

I maintain, sir, that a citizen of Georgia had, 



brated in another form ? Ft may be s.iid. in sueh instances, 
personal relations are founded in contract, and, therefore, 
ought t<> I"- resjsect id ; but that the relation of master and 
slave is net founded in contract, and therefore is to be re- 
spected only by the law of the place which recognizes it. 
Whoever so reasons encounters the authority of the whole 
6bdj of public law from Grotius down ; because there are 
numerous instances in which the law itself presumes, or 
implies contracts ; and prominent anion'; tilese instances is 
the very relation which we are considering, aid which re- 
lation is holden to draw after it mutuality of obligation." — 
Correspondence in the Creole case, Senate document, Ticcn- 
ty-Seventh Congress, vol. 1, p. 119. 

Mr. Nathan Dane, whose authority I know 



according to the fundamental principles of inter- I 1 will not be questioned in the free States, in the 
national law, the undoubted right to take his slave sixth volume of Dane's Abridgement, p. 430, 



property into any other foreign territory where 
the introduction of such property was not pro- 
hibited by some positive law operative in that 
foreign territory, declaring it to be against the 
policy, or prejudicial to the interests of the Gov- 
ernment having jurisdiction over that territory; 
and to have such property protected in that for- 
eign territory. It is the undoubted right of every 
independent sovereign State or nation to declare 
by positive law, that the introduction of slave or 
any other property into the territory of such State 
or nation, shall be against its policy, or prejudi- 
cial to its interests. My position is, that in the 



speaking of the law of nations, says: 
; " In the United States, as in England, the law of nations 
. is adopted in its full extent by the common law, and is held 
I to be a part of the lav; of the land.'' 

In Madrazo vs. Willis, (5th Eng. Com. Law 
\ Rep., 313,) these fundamental principles of inter- 
national law were practically applied to slave 
property by the court of King's Bench in Great 
Britain, in the year 1820. The question arose 
upon the following state of facts: A Spanish 
subject being engaged in the African slave trade, 
| (Spain not having entered into treaty stipulations 
abolishing that trade) had purchased three hun- 



absence of any such declaration as to what shall ! dred slaves on the coast of Africa, and had them 
be its policy, or prejudicial to its interests in | on board his vessel on her return voyage, when 
regard to the introduction of slave property, all she was captured by a British cruiser, and taken 
citizen of the independent State of Georgia had i into one of the ports of Great Britain, where the 
the unquestioned righj; to take his slave property I slaves, by the law of that kingdom, became free. 
into foreign territory, violating no law of that | The Spaniard brought his action of trover in the 
foreign territory, and would be entitled to have courts of Great Britain against the captain of the 



that property protected there. Let us see what 
are the fundamental principles of international 
law regulating this question. Huberus, in dis- 
cussing the conflict of laws between independent 
States and nations, in book first, section second, 
thus states the rule: 

' ; Every nation from comity admits that the laws of each 
nation of force within its own territorial limits, ought to be 
in force in all other nations, without injury to their re- 
spective powers and rights." 

This great fundamental principle of interna- 
tional law has been fully recognized by the Su 



British cruiser to recover the value of his vessel 
and stores, and the value of his three hundred 
slaves. On the trial before the Lord Chief Jus- 
tice, he doubted whether, in a British court, the 
plaintiff could maintain his action for the value of 
his three hundred slaves, and directed the jury to 
j find the damages separately; so much for the 
I vessel and stores, and so much for the three hun- 
! dred slaves — the latter constituting much the 
largest item. 

On the question being submitted to a full bench 
of judges, they were unanimously of the opinion 



preme Court of the United States, as applicable j 1 that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the full 
to the States of this Confederacy, in the Hank of value of his three hundred slaves, as well as the 
Augusta vs. Earle, 13th Peters, 589. Mr. Chief value of his vessel and stops, and awarded 
Justice Taney, in delivering the opinion of the | judgment therefor; recognizing tin; validity of 
court in that case, states the rule in these words: the Spaniard's title to his .slave property, which 

was good by the laws of his nation, in a British 
court. The slaves were not taken by the Span- 
iard into the kingdom of Great Britain, in viola- 
tion of her laws, but were seized upon the 
highway of nations, upon the empire of th 

ui e inmon ground, where the Spaniard had as 

much right to be with his property as the Eng- 
lishman; and the principle would have applied 
I have the authority of Mr. Webster upon this [with equal force if the slaves had been seized 
point, who, in his correspondence with Lord Upon common territory, the joint property of 
Ashlnu-ton, demanding satisfaction for slaves Great Britain and Spain. Tin; same principle is 
from the British Government, which had been applicable to the common territory of the Union, 
taken into one of the Bahama Islands, and set || which is common ground, being the joint property 



'• In the ■ ilence of &ny positive rule affirming, or denying, 
or restraining the operation of foreign lews, courts of jus 
tice pre ume the tacil adoption of them by their own Gov- 
ernment, unless they are repugnant to it- policy, or preju- 
dicial to as interests. Is i~ not th mity of the courts, 

but. the comity of the nation u hich i : administi red and as- 
certained i i the same way, and guided by the same reason- 
ing bj which all other principli - of municipal law are as- 
certained and guided." 



5 



of all the States, where the citizen of Georgia jj 
has as much right to be with his sl&ve property 
as the citizen of Ohio has to be there with his 
property — neither violating any law of thai ter- 
ritory by going into it with their property. When 
the citizen of an independent State, who has a 
title to his property good and valid by the laws 
of that State — and I have shown that slaves were 
recognized as property by the universal law of 
nations, and that no law of nations was a part 
of the common law — goes into foreign territory 
with that proprty, violating no law of that ter- 
ritory, these great fundamental principles of in- 
ternational law go with him; they are above him 



and around him; he inhales them in the very 
atmosphere which he breathes; thev protect his , , , 

iml his property; he.cannot escape their ° J ele ? ate ! h " !""","' l ? th 



person a 



needful rules and regulations respecting, the territory or 
other property belonging to the United States; and nothing 
i/i this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice 
any claims of the United States, or. of any particular Slate.*' 

The »rant of power in this clause is in regard 
to tlic Territory as property. Congress has power 
to dispose of it as property, as well as any other 
property belonging to the United States; may 
make " all needful rules and regulations respect- 
ing the Territory" considered as property; but 
who can believe that it was the intention of the 
framers of the Constitution to delegate those great 
inherent rights of property which I have been 
discussing to-day by thijs clause of the Consti- 
tution? Hut suppose we an- mistaken in this 
view of it, and that it was intended by this clause 
Federal Government 



binding influence unless, indeed, he goes beyond '\ t0 (1 "f , 1 ' lv ," ,1 '" P^P 1 ? '" , th " Statea oi the right to 
the pale of civilization, and there the principles ;| f 1 0n,, " 1 " , the i r ProP«ty, then the latter portion of 
of international law cease to operate. the clause forbids you to exercise ,t so as to pre- 



Mr. SANDIDGE. 



owme a to 'recall to the I J udi - Ce - the claim °' f an Y V'rljrulur State; anil to 



mind of the gentleman from Georgia a ease pre- 
cisely in point, to establish that which he is trying 
to establish before the committee. It is this: I 
noticed it in the newspapers some time last year. 
A gentleman from Brazil went to Prussia, carry- 
ing with him a slave. It was there attempted to 
deprive him of the services of that slave; and the 
highest tribunal of that country decided — ac- 
cording to the argument of the gentleman from 
Georgia — that his owner was entitled to him; that 
the matter should be decided according to the laws 
of the country from which the party came, and 
that he should have the right to hold his slave, 
and to carry him with him from the country at 
his pleasure. The gentleman from Georgia may 
have seen a notice of the case. 

Mr. WARNER. I do not recollect having seen 
it, but I have no doubt that that is the correct prin- 
ciple; I have no doubt that it is in consonance 
with the universal law of nations — with the great 
principles of international law. It existed in this 

country, and was a part of the law of the land at , Constitution never contemplated for one moment, 
the time the State of Georgia and the otherStates j that they had delegated the power in this clause 



exclude slave property would be not only to pre- 
judice the claims of one State, but the claims of 
fifteen States of this Union; for the common ter- 
ritory being the joint property of all the States, 
the slaveholding States claim an equal right to 
enjoy it with their property; and if you exercise 
the power to exclude them with their property, 
you prejudice their claims to that extent, which 
you are forbid to do. The principles of equality 
are indelibly stamped on tha/ace «f the Consti- 
tution. There is one clauseln the Constitution 
which declares that — 

"The citizens of each .State shall he entitled to all priv- 
ileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.'' 

This principle applies with much stronger force 
when applied to the common territory, which is 
the joint property of all the States. Surely the 
citizens of each State ought, upon principle, to be 
entitled to the same privileges and immunities in 
the common territory of all the States as they 
would in the States. No, sir, the framers of the 



entered into the constitutional compact. 

I have endeavored to establish the proposition, 
that, before and at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution, the citizens of the independent State 
of Georgia had the right, according to the well- 
established principles of international law, (which 
constituted a part of the law of the land,) to take 
their slave property into any foreign territory 
where its introduction was not prohibited, and 
to have it protected there. I have endeavored to 
show what were the fundamental rights of the 
p: ople of that State to their slave property before 
and at the time of the adoption of the Federal 
Constitution. 

The next question to be considered is,whi ther 
that State has delegated the power in the Consti 



to Congress to deprive them of those great fun- 
damental rights which belonged to them in respect 
to their property; but, on the contrary, the dele- 
gates from the southern States refused to enter 
into the compact until it was expressly stipulated 
that, if their slaveproperty should escape and get 
into the free States, they should be sum ndered 
up. 

Thcordinanee of 1 "ST has sometimes been relied 
on as conferring the power on Congress to exclude 
slavery from the Territories; but it will be recol- 
lected that ordinance was adopted prior to the 
formation of the Constitution. That was ;i com- 
pact between sovereign States, having the un- 
doubted right to make it; and five free States have 
been form id out of the North wi st Territory ceded 



tutionto this Government to deprive her of those by Virginia, which, but for that generous cession, 
fundamental rights? Has she delegated the power would have been slave territory. The rights 
in the Constitution to this Government to deprive secured by the Constitution are wnolly independ- 
herofthe fundamental right which she had as an ent of that ordinance, and have no necessary con- 
independent State to take her slave property into nection with it. Those irn at fundamental rights 
the common territory of the Union, there being which 1 have been di cussing to the 



no law in that territory which would be violati d 
by doing so? It is contended that this Govern- 
ment has that power by the clause which declares 
that— 
" Congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all 



of the St ind at the time of the 

adoption of the Constitution. Thi into, 

anil constituted an essential element of their title 
to their slave property, part and parcel of it; and, 
not having delegated them in the Constitution. 



6 



they have them now; and it is by virtue of those 
preexisting rights which are solemnly guarantied 
by the Constitution, that my constituents claim 
to be entitled to take their slave property in to; the 
common territory, and to have it protected then'. 
Tin' States are the original source of power: 
the Federal Government has no power except 
that which has been delegated to it by the States 
in the Constitution: and the States have now, 
as declared by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, in New Y ork vs. Miln.ll Peters, p. 138— 

"The same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over 
all persons and things within their territorial limits as any 
foreign nation where thai jurisdiction i- not surrendered or 
restrained by the Constitution oi'tlie United States." 

But, sir, independent of their legal right, my 
constituents have the equitable right to take then- 
slave property into the common territory of the 
Union. That territory is the joint property of all 
the States, slaveholding as well as non-slave- 
holding. There are but two ways in which prop- 
erty can honestly be acquired in this country: the 
one is by labor and industry; the other by inher- 
itance or bequest. A citizen of Georgia by his 
labor and industry acquires capital-money — a 
citizen of Ohio by his labor and industry does 
the same thing: the citizen of Georgia vests the 
proceeds of his labor in slave property — the citi- 
zen of Ohio vests his in merchandise, or stock, of 
in whatever he may choose to invest. They both 
desire to emigrate tn the common territory with 
the proceeds of their labor; and we will suppose 
that this Government shall, by a usurpation of 
authority, pass a law excluding slave property 
from that common territory. The citizen of Geor- 
gia and the citizen of Ohio meet upon the border 
of that territory. The citizen of Ohio is told that 
he can pass into that common territory with the 

Eroceeds of his labor and industry and enjoy it; 
ut the citizen of Georgia is told that he cannot 
go into that common territory and enjoy the benefit 
of his labor and industry. " Why," he inquires, 
" have not I obtained my property as honestly 
and fairly as the citizen of Ohio who has just gone 
in; and am I riot as much entitled to enjoy the 
benefit of that common territory as he is?" " Cer- 
tainly you are, but your property is of a different 
species,' arid, therefore, you must keep out. " Is 
that equality, orjustice, between citizens entitled 
to equal privileges 1 , and equal rights, under a 
common Government? Can any G ivernm ot 
that shall pursue such a course of policy main- 
tain the confidence of the people? 

But, sir, we have been told by those who ad- 
vocate this line of policy, that they do not desire 
to interfere' with slavery in the States where i: 
exists; and yet it is their intention to prevent the 
extension of slavery, by excluding it from the 
common territory — to surround the slave States 
"with a cordon of free territory, and con 
slavery, like a scorpion, to sting itself to death!" 
-Nov.- it matters but little with me, whether a man 
takes my property outright, or restricts me in the 
enjoyment of it, so as to render it of but little 
or no value to me. It is an interference with my 
rights in either case; the interference is one of 
degree only. Any restraint upon the use' and 
enjoyment of my property in as full and ample 
manner as I might oth r wise do, but for the restric- 
tion, is an interfen nee with it. There is not a 
slaveholder in this House or out of it, but who j 



knows perfectly well that, whenever slavery is 
confined within certain special limits, its future 
existence is doomed; it is only a question of time 
as to its final destruction. You may take any 
single slaveholding county in the southern States', 
in which the great staples of cotton and sugar are' 
cultivated to any extent, and confute the pr 
slave population within the limits of that county. 
Such is the rapid, natural increase of the slaves, 
and the rapid exhaustion of the soil in the cultiva- 
tion of those crops, (which add so much to the 
commercial wealth of the country,) that in a f'-w 
years it would be impossible to support them 
within the limits of each county. Both master 
and slave would be starved out; and what would 
be the practical effect in any one count}-, the same 
result would happen»to all the slaveholding States. 
Slavery cannot be confined within certain speci- 
fied limits without producing the destruction of 
both master and slave. It requires fresh lands, 
plenty of wood and water, not only for the com- 
fort and happiness of the slave, but for the benefit 
of the owner. We understand perfectly well the 
practical effect of the proposed restriction upon 
our rights, and to what extent it interferes with 
slavery in the States; and we also understand the 
object and purpose of that interference. If the 
slaveholding States should ever be so regardless 
of 'then-fights, and their honor, as coequal States, 
to be willing to submit to this proposed restriction, 
for the sake of harmony and peace, they could 
not do it. There is a great, overruling, practical 
necessity which would prevent it. They ought 
not to submit to it upon principle if they could, 
and could not if they would. 

It is in view of these things, sir, that the people 
of Georgia have assembled in convention, and 
solemnly resolved that, if Congress shall pass a 
law excluding them from the common territory 
with their slave property, they will disrupt the 
ties that bind them to the Union. This position 
has not been taken by way of threat or menace. 
Georgia never threatens, but Georgia always 
acts, whenever it is hecessary and proper for 
her to act for the protection of her constitutional 
rights and the rights of her people. She will not 
act hastily or rashly, but not the less firmly on 
that account. She intends to pla< right 

in the face of the world in regard to this question. 
She has delegated me, in co i with mv 

abler and more experienced colleagues, to make 
known her rights h re, and to proclaim them to 
the American people. She desires to maintain 
those rights within the Constitution, and for that 
purpose invoices the support of the friends of the 
Constitution in every portion of the eon an v. in 
order thai those rights may I s resp Led and ob- 
served. 1 have end :avor id to pn si it those ri 
in the consideration of this House to-day in 
L'-eul temp a-, and as becom I ttive 

of one of the old thirteen Stati s of this Con- 

fedl racy. 

I concur i tment uttered by the senior 

member from Ohio, [Mr. Giddings,] that we 
I discuss principles here; and 1 will add, 
after we have discussed them, we should regulate 
our conduct by them, not only here, but every- 
where. My constituents h i ire to force 
their institutions upon those who do not like 
them; all they ask is to be i ited in the 
enjoyment of those rights which were guarantied 



to them by the Constitution, not to be recognized 
as superior, nor as inferior, but simply as equals 
in this Confederacy. 

But it baa been said here, that the South acted 
in bad faith in consenting to die repeal <>t" the 
Missouri compromise. What is the history of 
that compromise ■ That act was forced upon the 
South by the aggressive policy of the North. The 
Louisiana T rntory was slave territory, and 
Missouri was formed out of that territory; the 
North resisted her admission into the Union, be- 
■ slavi ■■',- was recognized by her constitution; 
and, for the sake of peace and harmony, the South 
consented to the line of 36° 30', north of which 
shivery should be excluded. The term compromist 
necessarily implies a surrender of legal rights for 
the purpose of settlement — a waiver of constitu- 
tional rights for that object; no more was ever 
intended by that act. The South always main- 
tained that it was unconstitutional; hut acquiesced 
in it soh'y upon the principle of compromise, 
with the understanding that it was to be applied 
to all the territory of the Union; and it was so 
applied at that time. Missouri was admitted as 
a slave State. Iowa, formed out of the Louisiana 
Territory, which was originally slave territory, 
een admitted as a free State. 

But how did the North regard this sacred com- 
promise at the time, and since ? On the 6th of 
March, 1820, the act was passed, authorizing the 
people of Missouri Territory to form a .- 
constitution, by the eighth section of which act 
slavery was i secluded north of 36° 30'. On the 
2d of March. 182], the House. of Representatives 

passed a resolution providing for the admiss 

of Missouri into the Union, by the proclamation 
of the President, upon certain conditions to be 
performed by the Legislature of that State, when 
nearly the whole body of northern Representa- 
tives voted against the resolution for hi r admis- 
sion; and yel they now pretend to say that they 
have sacredly kept that sacred compact, when it 
was repudiated by their votes during the same 
session at which it was passed; and the a 
poraneous history of that period shows that this 
same compromis . now so sacred in the estima- 
tion of many northern politicians, was condemned 
and denounced by the enure North. 

The next territory that was acquired wasTexas, 
which wasalso slave territory. The compromise 
line was extended through that Territory, the 
North ap] all the slave territory north 

of 36 s 3D' to freedom! as she did from th< 
territory of Louisiana. The South, acting upon 
the under lal the compromise line was 

• all the territory of the Union, 
carried oul that undi in good faith in 

regard to thi si ve territory of Te 

The next territory which was acquired . s 
from Mex is free territory. TheS 

was still willing to abide the compromise line, 
and extend it through to the Pacific; bul 
North refused — willing to abide il so 1 
terril propriated to freedom, but 

when 1 • to inure to the 

ben< lit of th South., its binding obligation was 
denied and repudiated. Then it was tha 
South became released from all obligation to 



by that compromise, and was remitted to her 
original constitutional rights in respect to the com- 
mon territory. It has been said that the South 
received the benefit of the admission of Missouri 
into the" Union as a slavi State. The reply is, that 
Iowa has been admitted into the Union as a. free 
.with this marked difference, however, that 
Missouri was originally slave territory, and Iowa 
which was originally slave territory, is now a free 
State. TheS luth has gained nothing, and lost the 
of Iowa as slave territory. The impartial 
historian will be a) no loss to discover who it was 
that first repudiated the (Missouri compromise in 
respeel to the common t< rritory of the Union. 

After the Missouri compromise had been repu- 
diated by the North in regard to the territory 
acquired from Mexico, the South voted for the 
Kansas-Nebraska bill, which contains the true 
principles of non-intervention by Congress with 
the question of slavery as it exists in the Us i ted 
Stairs, in regarato the common territory of the 
Union — the true principles of the Constitution, 
which recognize the eqi il ri lits of the pi 
of all the States to theenjoymenl of that common 
territory. That act ought to be maintained, not 
only because it is right, just, and equal in its pro- 
visions to the people of all the States, but because 
it will have the effect to suppress agitation by 
demagogues, both North and South, of the ques- 
tion of slavery. To use a common expression, 
it will take the wind out of the sails of that class 
of politicians in both sections, who will be then 
nnable to navigate in still waters. In the South 
that class of men claim tobethi exclusive friends 
of slave institutions, and ask for a seat in Con- 
gress to protect that particular interest exclusively. 
In the North that class of men claim the support 
of the people, becau >e tiny are the exclusive oppo- 
nents of the slavery aggressions of the South, &s they 
are pleased to represent themselves; and the re- 
sult is, when they meet hi re the country is kept 
in a continual excitement, the legitimate business 
of the country neglected, that they may make 
political capital for themselves at home, in order 
to obtain place and power. 

I do not in; nd to be understood, sir, as saying 
that there are any of that class of men here now 
from either section of the country, the present 
company, you know, sir, is always excepted. I 
am only speaking of what might happen, and 
probably will happen, if this question of slavi ry 
agitation be not withdrawn from this Hall, and 
ople of the Territorii s, where-it 
legitimate!} • and where the Kansas-Ne- 

braska act refers it. It is, sir, for maintaining 
the salutary provisions of this act, so essential 
for the peace and best interests of this great coun- 
try, as well as the obligations imposed on him by 
n, that the President of the United 
has been denounced as a doughface. Far 
r is it for him, sir, as a man, and for his n p- 
utatio should be denounced 

.a maintaining the integrity of the 
titution of his country, than that In- should 
have given occasion to have been denounced as a 
perjured traitor to that Constitution which he had 
solemnly sworn to support and maintain in all its 
3 ■■■!- d provisions. 



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